Mortality Risks, Health Endowments, and Parental Investments in Infancy: Evidence from Rural India by Ashlesha Datar et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
MORTALITY RISKS, HEALTH ENDOWMENTS, AND PARENTAL INVESTMENTS IN INFANCY:










The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2007 by Ashlesha Datar, Arkadipta Ghosh, and Neeraj Sood. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Mortality Risks, Health Endowments, and Parental Investments in Infancy: Evidence from
Rural India
Ashlesha Datar, Arkadipta Ghosh, and Neeraj Sood




This paper examines whether increased background mortality risks induce households to make differential
health investments in their high- versus low-endowment children. We argue that increases in background
mortality risks may disproportionately affect the survival of the low-endowment sibling, consequently
increasing the mortality gap between the high- and low-endowment siblings. This increase in mortality
gap may induce households to investment more in their high endowment children. We test this hypothesis
using nationally representative data from rural India. We use birth size as a measure of initial health
endowment, immunization & breastfeeding as measures of childhood investments and infant mortality
rate in the child’s village as a measure of mortality risks. We find that in villages with high mortality
risks, small-at-birth children in a family are 6 - 17 percent less likely to be breastfed or immunized
compared to their large-at-birth siblings. In contrast, we find no significant within family differences
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Both developed and less developed countries have experienced a dramatic 
decline in infant mortality rates over the last few decades. World infant mortality 
rate is estimated to have declined from 198 in 1960 to 83 in 2001.  However, 
infant mortality in less developed countries remains high – roughly 10 times the 
rate in the developed world. Reducing infant mortality in the less developed world 
is thus one of the most important development challenges. The millennium 
development goals have set a target to reduce infant mortality rates by two-thirds 
from 1990 to 2015. 
The direct health benefits of reducing infant mortality are obvious. 
However, reductions in infant mortality might also have indirect effects that are 
less well understood. In particular, childhood mortality risks are a major source of 
risk in the returns to childhood investments. Thus, reductions in mortality risks 
could affect parental investments in children, consequently affecting children’s 
long term health and economic well being. For example, Dow et al. (1999) show 
that the incentive to invest in child health depends inversely on the level of 
mortality risks. They find evidence that the reduction in mortality risks due to the 
Expanded Programme on Immunization of the World Health Organization 
increased parental health investments unrelated to immunization.  Similarly, 
Estevan and Baland (2007), argue that high mortality risks could lead to 
inefficient investments in human capital. They show that the level of child labor 
could be inefficiently high when survival is uncertain and parents expect cash 
transfers from their children. This is because, given the uncertain survival of their 
child, parents tend to favor a certain investment, such as saving, to an uncertain 
one, such as human capital.  
In this paper, we add to this literature by examining how mortality risks 
affect intra-household childhood investments in siblings with different initial 
health endowments. We argue that increases in background mortality risks 
disproportionately affect the survival of the weaker sibling. Thus, increases in 
mortality risk not only increase overall risks but also increase the mortality gap 
between siblings with high and low initial health endowments. Since mortality 
risks are one of the important drivers of returns to parental investments, we argue 
that increases in mortality risks should also increase disparities in parental 
investments across high and low initial health endowment children.  We 
empirically test this prediction using data from rural India. We use birth size as a 
measure of initial health endowment, immunization & breastfeeding as measures 
of childhood investments and infant mortality rate in the child’s village as a 
measure of mortality risks. We find that in villages with high mortality risks, 
small-at-birth children in a family are less likely to be breastfed or immunized 
compared to their large-at-birth siblings. In contrast, we find no significant within   3
family differences in investments in villages with low mortality risks. This finding 
is robust and cannot be explained by either differences in preferences or access to 
health infrastructure across high- and low-infant mortality areas.  
This paper also makes a direct contribution to the empirical literature on 
the effect of endowment differences on intra-household resource allocation 
(Griliches, 1979; Behrman et al., 1982; Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982; 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1988; Pitt et al., 1990; Behrman et al., 1994; Ayalew, 
2005; Datar et al., 2006; Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2006).
1 Previous work in this 
area has generally treated endowments as observable to parents but unobservable 
to researchers. Notable exceptions are the recent studies by Datar et al. (2005), 
and Rosenzweig and Zhang (2006) that use birth weight as a proxy for health 
endowment and conduct a direct test of whether variation in birth weight across 
siblings generates differences in parental investments. We adopt a similar 
approach in this paper, but in the absence of good clinical data on birth weight, 
utilize birth size as reported by the mother as an indicator of children’s initial 
endowment. Birth size is directly observable to parents, and it has also been found 
to be highly correlated with birth weight (Moreno and Goldman, 1990). 
Therefore, as in studies by Datar et al. (2006) and Rosenzweig and Zhang (2006), 
our measure of endowment is likely to be quite close to that used by parents in 
assessing the initial healthiness of a child. Additionally, we extend these earlier 
analyses, by explicitly modeling and testing for the effect of background mortality 
risks on parental investment strategies.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the 
data and variables used for this analysis, and discuss our measures for birth size, 
parental investments, and background mortality. In section 3, we present a model 
of parental investments that motivates our empirical approach. Section 4 discusses 
our empirical strategy, and section 5 presents the main results. In section 6, we 
discuss additional results from a number of robustness checks, and section 7 
concludes.  
 
2. Data and Measures 
 
We use data from the 1992-93 National Family Health Survey (NFHS). 
The NFHS surveyed a nationally representative sample of households in India’s 
26 major states, and the primary respondents were ever-married women in the 13-
49 age group.  Structured interviews were conducted with the women and the 
household in which they resided. Detailed information on the survey is available 
                                                 
1 Behrman et al. (1995) and Behrman (1997) offer excellent reviews of the literature on 
intrahousehold resource allocation. 
   4
at http://www.nfhsindia.org. We use the rural sub-sample of NFHS for our 
analysis, which has detailed information on 35,318 children between the ages of 0 
and 47 months, born to 26,865 mothers who were sampled from the rural primary 
sampling units. As mentioned before, we would have liked to utilize birth weight 
information for children as the measure of initial health endowment. However, 
birth weight is available for less than 10% of the children in our sample
2, whereas 
information on birth size (small, average, large) is available for more than 98% of 
the children.
3 Therefore, for the purpose of our analysis, we first restrict our 
sample to mothers with at least 2 children for whom birth size information is 
available. Next, we only keep children for whom there is information on at least 
one of the parental investments examined in the paper. This reduces our sample 
size to 16,088 children born to 7,891 mothers. The exact sample sizes in our 
regressions drop further when we exclude observations with missing values for 
the particular parental investment being examined, and/or with missing values for 
any of the other variables in our analysis.
4 
We exploit 5 key features of the NFHS for the purposes of this paper. 
First, the NFHS collected detailed information on each child born to an 
interviewed woman since January 1988/1989. That is, information was collected 
on children even if they had died by the time of the survey. For women who had 
more than one live birth during this 4 year period (1988-89 to 1992-93), 
information was obtained on the 3 most recent live births. This allows us to 
examine intra-family resource allocation decisions over a relatively short time 
horizon, during which major changes in the socio-economic circumstances of a 
family are unlikely to occur. This is important because one might be concerned 
that between-sibling differences in birth size and health investments might simply 
be a consequence of changes in the family’s socioeconomic circumstance at the 
time of birth of the various siblings.  
Second, we have information on birth size for almost all surveyed 
children, and use this as a proxy for a child’s initial endowment. In some ways, 
birth size may be a better measure of initial health endowment for our analysis 
compared to actual birth weight. Birth size is mother-reported and therefore, 
captures the perceived “healthiness” of the child.  Ultimately, it is this perception 
                                                 
2 Missing data on birth weight for a large part of our rural sample is mainly due to the fact that 
most deliveries in rural India take place outside of health facilities and are done by traditional mid-
wives who typically do not measure the newborn’s weight at birth. 
3 Moreno and Goldman (1990) report that relative size at birth as reported in the Demographic and 
Health Surveys (DHS) was of reasonably high quality, and was well correlated with measured 
birth weights.  
4 In analyses not reported here, we also used the 1998-99 wave of the NFHS (NFHS-2) to estimate 
similar models, but our estimates from NFHS-2 lacked precision due to a significantly smaller 
final sample of mothers and children. Hence, we only report results from using NFHS-1 in this 
paper.    5
that is likely to influence parent’s decisions, regardless of what the child’s actual 
endowment may be.  In rural households, where the majority of births take place 
outside the formal health care system, birth size may be the only indicator of the 
live infant’s healthiness to the parent.  
Third, the NFHS collected information on two key health investments that 
parents make in their children during infancy and early childhood – breastfeeding 
and immunizations. This information was collected for a maximum of 3 children 
in the family who were born within the last 4 years, allowing us to estimate 
mother fixed-effect models. 
Fourth, the availability of information on maternal and child 
characteristics, as well as on prenatal investments at the time of each child’s birth 
allows us to control for observable difference across siblings that may be 
correlated with birth outcomes as well as parental investments.  
Finally, the birth history information obtained from each mother allows us 
to construct a village level measure of infant mortality that captures the 
background mortality risk for infants in each village.  
The main outcomes of interest in our study are health investments that 
parents make in their children during infancy. In particular, we focus on 
immunizations and breastfeeding: 
 
1.  Whether the child received all age appropriate doses of Polio vaccination. 
2.  Whether the child received all age appropriate doses of non-Polio, i.e., BCG 
and DPT vaccinations.  
3.  Whether the child was breastfed for at least 6 months.  
 
Health investments such as breastfeeding and immunizations during a 
child’s first year are highly recommended by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and are also included as objectives in the various child health programs of 
the Department of Family Welfare in India (Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare, 2006). In order to increase immunization coverage, the Government of 
India started the Universal Immunization Program (UIP) in 1985-86, which aimed 
to vaccinate at least 85% of all infants by 1990 against the 6 vaccine-preventable 
diseases or VPDs (tuberculosis, diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, poliomyelitis, and 
measles). The Innocenti Declaration on the Protection, Promotion, and Support of 
Breastfeeding (1990), and the WHO Working Group on Infant Feeding (WHO, 
1991) made several recommendations, which state that infants should be 
exclusively breastfed for 4 to 6 months. Also, previous research has shown that 
breastfeeding protects children from a number of diseases including 
gastrointestinal tract infections, and atopic eczema (Kramer et al., 2001). A 
systematic review of evidence by the WHO on the optimal duration of exclusive   6
breastfeeding finds that exclusive breastfeeding for at least 6 months can reduce 
child morbidity from gastrointestinal infections (Kramer and Kakuma, 2002).  
Data on immunization were collected in the NFHS through the mother 
questionnaire for children in the age group of 2-35 months.  Mothers were asked 
about the immunizations received by each of her eligible children, and where 
possible, this information was verified by cross-checking against the child’s 
vaccination card.  Specifically, the survey asked whether the child had received 
BCG, DPT (all doses), Polio (all doses) and Measles vaccinations.  We 
distinguish between 2 types of immunization coverage – Polio and non-Polio. 
Since both the timing as well as completeness of vaccinations are important, we 
follow Datar et al.’s (2006) approach and denote a child as having “full age 
appropriate coverage” for polio or non-polio vaccinations using Government of 
India’s Recommended Immunization Schedule (Table 1).  Thus, for example, a 
child who is 3 months old, and has BCG, DPT1 and 2, and Polio1 vaccines would 
be classified as having “fully age appropriate coverage” under the non-Polio 
vaccine category, but would be classified as not having “fully age appropriate 
coverage” for the Polio vaccine.  This approach allows us to distinguish between 
children who receive age appropriate coverage and children who are immunized 
at an older (or younger) age and therefore are exposed to the risk of VPDs for a 
longer duration of time (or are physiologically not ready for vaccination).  
Mothers were asked about their breastfeeding behavior for each of their 3 
most recent live births in the past 4 years. The survey questions did not ask about 
exclusive breastfeeding, but instead focused on any breastfeeding, including when 
it was initiated and how for long it was done. Following the WHO guidelines, our 
breastfeeding measure captures whether the child was breastfed for at least 6 
months. For the breastfeeding analysis, we restrict our sample to children 6 
months and older. 
The means and standard deviations of the parental investment variables 
and other explanatory variables are reported in panels A and B of table 2 – for 
children in our analysis (those with at least one sibling), and the original sample 
of children respectively. These suggest that children in our analysis sample are 
quite similar to those in the original sample with respect to parental investments 
as well as other attributes. Based on the summary statistics for our analysis 
sample (panel A), we find that only about 35% of the children were fully 
immunized against polio, while only a quarter were fully immunized against non-
polio diseases. In contrast, nearly three-quarters of the children were breastfed for 
at least 6 months. This suggests that breastfeeding was fairly widespread in rural 
India, compared to immunization. 
Birth size information for each child in the NFHS was reported by the 
mother retrospectively. Specifically, mothers were asked to report whether a 
particular child was “large”, “average”, or “small” when he/she was born, for   7
each of her 3 most recent live births within the 4 years preceding the survey. The 
median number of months between the child’s birth and the mother’s report of 
that child’s birth size, or the “recall” period in our sample is 22 months or about 2 
years.
5 Nearly a quarter of all children in our sample were smaller than average 
size at birth (hereafter small-at-birth). Additionally, the median age of the mother 
at birth was 22 years, the median birth order was 3, and exactly half the children 
were male.  
There exists a substantial amount of within-family variation in birth size 
and parental investments in our data.  Table 3 reports the percentage of families 
with intra-family variation in birth size and health investments i.e. at least one 
sibling had a different birth size or investment compared to the other siblings.  
More than 26% of the families in this sample have across-sibling variation in birth 
size and in age-appropriate polio coverage, and 22% of the families have variation 
across siblings in age-appropriate non-polio coverage. About 41% of the families 
have variation across siblings in whether they were breastfed for 6 or more 
months.  
Finally, we measure background mortality risk by constructing a village 
level infant mortality rate. Using retrospective birth history data, we aggregate the 
number of children born in a village within the previous 4 years across all women 
who were interviewed in that village, and also the number of children who died 
before the age of one to construct an infant mortality rate for each village in our 
sample. We classify a village as having high background mortality risk if the 
infant mortality rate for that village exceeds the median infant mortality rate in the 
distribution, which is 7% (same as the mean).  
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
In this section, we outline a simple one-period model of parental 
investments in children’s health when child survival is uncertain. We follow the 
approach of consensus parental preference models (Behrman, 1997) and assume 
that altruistic parents maximize their consensus utility function  
  
(1) U[V(h1, h2,…, hn), Y] 
 
                                                 
5 This is comparable to the median recall period for birth weight in Datar et al.’s (2006) study that 
used the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 – Child Data. Parental recall of birth weight 
has been found to be fairly accurate in a number of studies (Walton et al., 2000; O’Sullivan et al., 
2000). Maternal recall of whether the child was born bigger or smaller than average is likely to be 
more accurate relative to a numerical birth weight. 
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where V(.) is a parental welfare function that has as its arguments the adult health 
of each child (hi), and Y is the parents’ consumption.  
Parents maximize their utility function subject to two constraints: the 
health production function for each child and the household’s budget constraint. 
The health production function shows the adult health of child i and is increasing 
in health and educational investments that parents make in the child (xi) and the 
child’s endowment (ei), but is decreasing in the background mortality risk (m) that 
the child faces. m refers to the underlying risk of dying due to factors exogenous 
to the household.  
 
(2) hi = h(xi, ei, m)  i= 1, 2,…, n 
 
The budget constraint requires that parental expenditures on their own 
consumption and investments in their children’s health not exceed their total 
resources (M). 
 
(3)  M Y x
n
i




where v is the relative price of parental inputs. 
  First order conditions from the above model can be written as follows.  
 
(4)  j i ≠ ∀ ′ ′ = ′ ′        h V   h V
j j i i x h x h    
 
The above equation shows that the marginal benefit from investing in each child 
should be equal at the optimum. The first term on the left hand side captures the 
marginal utility to the parent from an increase in child i’s health. The second term 
on the left hand side captures the marginal returns in terms of health from an 
increase in parental inputs into child i.  
The optimal level of parental investment in each child (xi*) is a function of 
the child’s endowment, background mortality risk, price of parental inputs, and 
income: 
 
(5)  ) , , , (
* * M m e x x i i i ν =   
 
In this paper, we are specifically interested in two comparative statics – (a) how 
parental investments change as the child’s endowment increases i.e.  i i de dx
* , and 
(b) how parental responsiveness to child endowment changes as background 
mortality risk increases i.e.  dm de x d i i
* 2 .    9
 
From the first order condition, it can be seen that xH*- xL*, which is the 
difference in parental investments between a high (H) endowment and a low (L) 
endowment child, depends upon two quantities – (a) the ratio of the marginal 
utility of health for the two children (
H L h h V V ′ ′ ), and (b) the ratio of the marginal 
returns to parental investments for the two children (
H L x x h h ′ ′ ). The first quantity 
depends upon the properties of the parental welfare function V(.) i.e. parental 
preferences for equity versus efficiency and whether parents have “equal concern” 
for all their children
6. For example, all else equal, xH*- xL* is likely to be smaller 
for parents who exhibit a higher preference for equity or who have greater 
concern for their low endowment child. The second quantity depends upon the 
properties of the health production function h(.), in particular, whether the returns 
to parental investments are higher for the high or low endowment child. For 
example, xH*- xL* is likely to be larger if returns to parental investments increase 
with endowments. Therefore, it is a priori unclear whether xH*- xL* is positive, 
negative or zero.   
The second comparative static examines how xH*- xL* changes as 
background mortality risk increases. In general, this effect would depend upon 
how the ratios 
H L h h V V ′ ′  and 
H L x x h h ′ ′  vary with background mortality risk. An 
increase in background mortality risk would reduce the probability of surviving to 
adulthood, and therefore returns to parental investments, for all children. 
However, the magnitude of reduction in these returns might critically depend on 
the endowment of the child. For example, an increase in background mortality 
risk might affect the survival probability of the low endowment child more than 
that of her high endowment sibling. This is because lower endowment children 
might be less resilient and more susceptible to disease. Consequently, the returns 
to parental investment in the low endowment child reduce more compared to the 
returns to investment in the high endowment sibling. This change in relative 
returns implies that an increase in background mortality risk will increase xH*- 
xL*. Changes in background mortality risk, however, might also be related to 
changes in parental preferences. For example, parents with a high preference for 
equity might choose to live in areas with low mortality risks. Therefore, it is a 
priori unclear how changes in mortality risk affect xH*- xL*. Ultimately, how 
changes in background mortality risk affect investments in children is an 
empirical question which we test in the subsequent sections.  
 
                                                 
6 “Equal concern” refers to whether the parental preference indifference curves are symmetric 
around the 45 degree line. Parental preferences for equity versus efficiency are captured by the 
shape of the indifference curves (e.g. L-shaped or straight lines).   10
4. Empirical Strategy  
 
An econometric model for the demand function shown in equation (5) can 
be written as follows:   
 
(6)  if i f if f if if if X ity highmortal small small I ε φ γ β β β + + + + + = 3 2 1 *       
 
where “i” indexes child, and “f” indexes family. The dependent variable, I, is an 
indicator for whether a child received a specific parental investment or not. A 
child’s own endowment is captured by the variable small, which is an indicator 
for whether the child was smaller than average birth size.
7 The variable 
highmortality is a village level indicator for whether the infant mortality rate in 
that village was greater than the median mortality rate (7%). The vector Xif 
includes other child- and family- specific characteristics that may influence 
parental investment, child survival and birth outcomes (e.g. gender, income, price 
of health inputs). In addition to these “observed” characteristics are a set of 
unobservable factors that affect parental investments –  f γ  represents unobserved 
endowments and environmental influences (pre- and post-natal) common to all 
siblings in a family and  i φ  represents unobserved child-specific factors that are 
correlated with parental investments and birth outcomes. Finally,  if ε  is an 
idiosyncratic error term.  
The key parameters of interest in equation (6) are  1 β  and 2 β .  1 β  captures 
the effect of own-endowment on parental investment.  2 β  captures the additional 
effect of own-endowment in areas where the background mortality risk is high.
8  
The model that we estimate, however, is the following:  
 
(7)  if f if f if if if X ity highmortal small small I ν γ α α α + + + + = 3 2 1 *      
 
where,  if i if ε φ ν + = . While the mother fixed-effect  f γ controls for the influence 
of all unobserved family specific factors correlated with parental investment and 
birth outcomes, one might be concerned that the error term may still include 
sibling-specific factors that are correlated with parental investment and birth 
outcomes. Below, we discuss 3 reasons why such concerns are minimized. First, 
we include a number of sibling-specific controls in Xif  such as gender, birth 
                                                 
7 Dow et al. (1999) also use this as their measure of low birth weight. 
 
8 The direct effect of highmortality, which does not vary across siblings within a family, cannot be 
estimated in this model due to the inclusion of the family fixed effect.   11
month, birth order, mother’s age at birth, and a host of prenatal investments in 
child i such as whether the mother received iron folic tablets during pregnancy, 
whether she was given tetanus injections before birth, and the trimester of her first 
antenatal visit. Inclusion of these covariates will absorb a lot of the important 
sibling-specific heterogeneity contained in the error term. Second, the siblings 
within a family are all born within a relatively short time period. This 
significantly reduces the likelihood that aspects of family circumstance, not 
already captured by our covariates, changed enough between the birth of the 2 
siblings to affect their birth size and parental investments. Third, if the bias from 
sibling-specific heterogeneity remains the same across high- and low-infant 
mortality villages, then the estimated  2 α will be unbiased, because  2 α captures the 
differential effect of being small in high mortality areas.
9 In section 6, we test 
whether the bias from sibling-specific heterogeneity is the same across high and 
low mortality villages. 
We estimate equation (7) using linear probability models and adjust the 
standard errors for clustering at the family level (Bertrand et al 2004). 
 
5. Results  
 
We begin by reporting estimates from a special case of the model in 
equation (7) that assumes there are no differences in parental response to birth 
size across high- and low-infant mortality areas i.e.  0 2 = α . Panel A in Table 4 
reports the estimated effects of being smaller-than-average birth size on the 
likelihood of receiving age-appropriate polio and non-polio immunizations and 
breastfeeding for at least 6 months. We find that children with smaller birth size 
are significantly less likely to be immunized against both polio and non-polio 
diseases relative to their larger birth size siblings; smaller birth size siblings have 
a  4 and 3 percentage point lower likelihood of being immunized against polio and 
non-polio diseases, respectively, and both these effects are significant at the 1% 
level. However, a child’s relative birth size does not significantly affect her 
chances of being breastfed for at least 6 months. Among other covariates in the 
model, gender, maternal age and prenatal investments are associated with 
immunizations, but not with breastfeeding. Boys
10 and siblings born when the 
                                                 
9 To see this, let δ1 and δ2 be the estimated coefficients on small from 2 separate regressions that 
estimate equation (3) using the low mortality and high mortality subsamples, respectively. The 
difference δ2 - δ1 is equal to the estimate α2 from equation (3). If δ1 =β1+bias and δ2 = β1+ β2+bias 
then δ2 -  δ1 = β2. 
 
10 To examine the hypothesis that parental response to birth size differences between their children 
might depend upon whether the small birth size child is a boy or girl, we tested for the interaction   12
mother is younger and when she took tetanus injections and iron folic tablets 
during pregnancy have a significantly greater likelihood of receiving polio and 
non-polio immunizations. For breastfeeding, first borns are less likely to be 
breastfed for 6 months and younger mothers are less likely to breastfeed for 6 
months or more. 
Panel B in Table 4 reports estimates from the model in equation (7). The 
interaction term tests whether parents residing in villages with a high infant 
mortality rate are more likely to adopt a reinforcing strategy compared to parents 
in villages with lower background mortality. Our results confirm this hypothesis. 
In high infant mortality villages, a small birth size child is about 6 and 4 
percentage points less likely to be immunized for polio and non-polio vaccines, 
respectively, compared to her better endowed siblings. However, there is no 
significant effect of a child’s birth size on immunizations in low infant mortality 
villages. Further, the same reinforcing pattern in parental investments is now 
observed for breastfeeding as well. In high mortality villages, a small birth size 
child is about 4 percentage points less likely to be breastfed for at least 6 months 
compared to her larger birth size siblings. As in the case of immunizations, there 




6. Robustness Checks 
 
There is some concern that infant mortality rate is not an exogenous 
measure of background mortality risks. Thus, it is possible that our results might 
be driven by observed or unobserved differences across high- and low-mortality 
villages that are correlated with investments in children. To address this issue we 
test the robustness of our results for two important sources of heterogeneity across 
high- and low-infant mortality villages.  The first analysis examines whether our 
results are driven by differential preferences for discrimination across high- and 
low- infant mortality villages. Our second analysis tests whether our results are 
                                                                                                                                     
between birth size and gender in an alternate specification (results available from the authors upon 
request). The interaction effect was not statistically significant, and all other estimated parameters 
were same as before.  
11 We also estimated equation (3) with a continuous measure of infant mortality at the village level 
instead of the indicator for high mortality. The results were similar to those reported above. 
Additionally, we compared villages above the 75
th percentile in the distribution of the infant 
mortality rate with those below the 25
th percentile, instead of looking at villages above and below 
the median. Once again, results were similar suggesting a stronger reinforcing pattern in villages 
with high background mortality risk.  
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explained by differences in health infrastructure availability across high- and low- 
infant mortality villages.
12  
In the last two subsections we report results from 2 additional robustness 
checks. The first analysis tests the sensitivity of our main results to presence of 
other small-at-birth siblings in the household. Finally, our last set of tests 
examines whether our results can be explained by unobserved sibling level 
economic shocks that affect both child endowments and post natal investments. 
 
6.1. Do Preferences for Discrimination Explain the Stronger Reinforcing 
Effects in High Mortality Villages? 
 
As discussed in section 3, it may be possible that villages that have a high 
background mortality risk are also those that have generally higher parental 
preferences for discrimination. If this were true, the evidence of stronger 
reinforcing effects in high mortality villages might be the result of such parental 
preferences rather than the result of background mortality per se. To test this 
alternate explanation, we examine intra-household gender differences in parental 
investments across high- and low- infant mortality villages. If the stronger 
reinforcing effects in high mortality villages are driven purely by parental 
preferences for discrimination then we should find that parents in high mortality 
villages are more likely to discriminate between their sons and daughters. 
Table 5 reports estimates from models that include an additional 
interaction term for male child and high background mortality. There are 3 
notable results from this analysis. First, our main finding that parents in high 
mortality villages are more likely to reinforce birth size differences remains 
unchanged. Second, consistent with the prior literature, we also find that parents 
are significantly more likely to immunize their sons compared to daughters. And 
finally, the insignificant coefficient on the male-high mortality interaction 
suggests that parents in high mortality villages do not have any different 
preferences for gender discrimination compared to parents in low mortality 
villages. 
 
6.2. Does Differential Availability of Health Infrastructure Explain the 
Stronger Reinforcing Effects in High Mortality Villages? 
 
                                                 
12 Use of natural disaster or epidemics as instruments for background mortality is problematic for 
several reasons. First, such disasters and epidemics not only affect infant mortality but also affect 
adult mortality, access to health infrastructure and local economies. Second, disasters and 
epidemics typically engender an endogenous policy response in terms of increased aid in cash or 
in kind to these affected areas. These changes might have a direct effect on childhood investments 
independent of the changes in mortality risks.   14
One might be concerned that villages with high infant mortality also have 
inadequate health infrastructure. If this were true, the evidence of stronger 
reinforcing effects in high mortality villages might be the result of differential 
health infrastructure availability rather than the effect of background mortality per 
se (Oster, 2006). To address this concern, we examine whether the interaction 
between small and highmortality is significantly different in villages that have at 
least a Primary Health Center (PHC) compared to villages that do not have a 
PHC.
 13  
  Table 6 reports estimates from models that include a triple interaction term 
for small, highmortality, and an indicator for whether there is a PHC or bigger 
health facility in the village. Two main results stand out from this analysis. First, 
parents’ response to differences in their children’s birth size is not influenced by 
whether there is a PHC present in the village. And second, the triple interaction 
term is statistically insignificant for all investments suggesting that the stronger 
reinforcing effect found in high mortality villages is not explained by differences 
in health infrastructure availability.
14 
 
6.3. Controlling for the Presence of Other Small-at-Birth Siblings in the 
Household 
 
As pointed out in Datar et al. (2006), other siblings’ endowments could 
also impact the amount of investment parents make in child i. Presence of other 
less-endowed siblings in the household might increase or decrease the level of 
parental investment in a child because, first, the realization of a low endowment 
child might raise parental concern for all children and therefore increase the levels 
of all subsequent investments, and second, parents’ ability to either reinforce or 
compensate for endowment differences would depend upon the endowments of 
other children in the household who compete for the same limited family 
resources. Since a child’s endowment is likely to be correlated with that of his or 
her siblings, failure to control for siblings’ endowment may lead to biased 
estimates of the effect of birth size on parental investments. In addition, it is likely 
that presence of other small-at-birth siblings is correlated with background 
mortality.  
To check the robustness of our results, we re-estimate equation (7) with 
the inclusion of another dummy variable that captures whether the child has any 
                                                 
13 Using NFHS data, Datar et al (2007) found that presence of a PHC or bigger health facility in 
the village had a significant impact on immunizations, but smaller sizes facilities had no effect. 
 
14 We obtained similar results by reestimating the regressions reported in tables 6 and 7 with a 
continuous measure of infant mortality at the village level (instead of the indicator for high 
mortality).    15
siblings who were also small-at-birth and are currently alive (results reported in 
Table 7). This variable is measured during the first year of child i’s life, when 
majority of the immunization and breastfeeding investments are made. The value 
of this variable varies across siblings. We find that the presence of other small-at-
birth siblings does not have any significant effect on parental investments in a 
child – as shown by the estimated coefficients on “any small-at-birth siblings 
present”. Moreover, the effect of birth size on immunizations remains virtually 
unchanged – both in terms of magnitude and the direction of effects. 
 
 
6.4. Do Unobserved Economic Shocks Explain the Stronger Reinforcing Effects 
in High Mortality Villages? 
 
Finally, as discussed in section 5, there may be concern that our results are 
partly driven by unobserved sibling level economic shocks correlated with birth 
size and parental investments that vary across high- and low-mortality villages. In 
other words, the bias from sibling-specific heterogeneity may differ across high- 
and low-infant mortality villages. To address this concern, we performed 2 tests. 
First, we estimated models without child level covariates. The results from this 
test are reported in Table 8, and show that the estimates are similar to the 
estimates in Panel B of Table 4. Thus, we find that our results are virtually 
unchanged when we add child level covariates, including prenatal investments. 
Second, we reestimated our models with births spaced within 2 years of each 
other. The assumption here is that family circumstances are likely to change 
slowly over time and therefore sibling-specific heterogeneity is likely to be 
minimal. The point estimates from this test are also similar to those from the full 
sample, although the standard errors are larger as we drop more than 75% of the 
observations due to the restriction of closer spaced births. Both these tests suggest 




In this paper, we examined the relationship between a child’s initial health 
endowment, measured by birth size, and parental investments that promote child 
health, when infants’ survival is uncertain. Using data from rural Indian 
households, we estimated mother fixed-effects models to examine whether there 
were any systematic differences in health investments such as immunizations and 
breastfeeding across children who were relatively larger-at-birth compared to 
their small-at-birth siblings. We found that parents in villages with a high infant 
mortality rate adopted a reinforcing strategy of investments in child health 
whereby larger-at-birth children were significantly more likely to be immunized   16
and breastfed compared to their small-at-birth siblings. For example, in villages 
with high infant mortality, small-at-birth children in a family were 4-6 percentage 
points less likely to receive these health investments compared to their large-at-
birth siblings. In percentage terms, these amount to a 17 percent, 16 percent, and 6 
percent reduction in the probabilities of polio vaccination, non-polio vaccination, 
and breastfeeding respectively. In contrast, we found no significant differences in 
breastfeeding and immunization rates between small at birth and large at birth 
siblings in low infant mortality villages.  
These results show that children’s endowment differences as well as 
background mortality risk can have sizeable impacts on intra-household resource 
allocations in a developing country. They also show that reductions in mortality 
can not only improve overall population health but also reduce health disparities. 
Reductions in mortality affect less endowed and weaker children more than 
healthy children. Thus, they create unique incentives for parents to invest in 
weaker children, consequently reducing health disparities.   
The results also highlight that public health investments do not crowd out 
private investments in child health. In fact, they are complements. For example, 
public health interventions that improve birth weight are likely to encourage 
parental investments such as immunizations and breast feeding. Dow et al. (1999) 
make a similar argument in their study that showed that women were more likely 
to increase inputs into birth weight when the United Nation’s Expanded 
Programme of Immunization (EPI) was implemented. By decreasing the 
probability of child mortality from any of the 6 vaccine preventable diseases, the 
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Table 1: Government of India’s Recommended Immunization Schedule 
Age Age  BCG  DPT  Polio  Measles
(weeks) (months)         
Age Appropriate 
Coverage for all India 
Birth 0 X    X
1   BCG 
6 weeks  1.5    X  X    BCG + DPT1 + Polio1 
10 weeks  2.5    X  X    BCG + DPT1-2 + Polio1-2 
14 weeks  3.5    X  X    BCG + DPT1-3 + Polio1-3 
36 weeks  9.0        X  BCG + DPT1-3 + Polio1-3 + Measles
 
1 Polio vaccination at birth is recommended in all institutional deliveries and in all endemic areas. 
 
Source:  Universal Immunization Program Division, Department of Family Welfare, Min. of 
Health & Family Welfare http://cbhidghs.nic.in/hii2003/12.01.htm  
 
 
   21
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
   Panel A: Analysis sample  Panel B: Full sample 
Variable  Mean Median  Std.  Dev.  Obs. Mean Median  Std.  Dev.  Obs. 
Parental investments                
Age appropriate Polio coverage  0.35  0  0.48  16015  0.38  0  0.49  35174 
Age appropriate non-Polio coverage  0.25  0  0.43  15757  0.27  0  0.44  34590 
Breastfed for at least 6 months  0.72  1  0.45  15984  0.78  1  0.42  34980 
Explanatory variables                 
Small-at-birth  0.23 0  0.42  16088  0.22 0  0.41  34760 
Sex of child (Male =1)  0.50  1  0.50  16088  0.51  1  0.50  35318 
Birth  order  2.71 3  1.11  16088  2.58 3  1.20  35318 
Month of birth  6.82  7  3.39  16088  6.79  7  3.41  35318 
Age of Child if alive (months)  22.90  22  15.15  14348  22.67  22  13.93  32408 
Any small-at-birth siblings present in household  0.08  0  0.27  16088  0.04  0  0.19  35318 
Mother's age at birth (years)  23.37  22  5.26  16088  23.82  23  5.78  35318 
Given iron folic tablets during pregnancy  0.44  0  0.50  16082  0.45  0  0.50  35145 
Tetanus injections before birth  1.20  1  1.22  15996  1.26  1  1.23  34960 
First antenatal visit in 1st trimester  0.18  0  0.38  16088  0.19  0  0.40  35318 
First antenatal visit in 2nd trimester  0.27  0  0.44  16088  0.27  0  0.44  35318 
First antenatal visit in 3rd trimester  0.11  0  0.31  16088  0.11  0  0.31  35318 
Background variables                 
High infant mortality in village  0.56  1  0.50  16088  0.54  1  0.50  35318 
Health infrastructure (at least PHC) in village  0.16  0  0.36  16088  0.17  0  0.37  35318 
 
Source: National Family Health Survey – Wave I (1992-93) 
Note: Summary statistics have been adjusted with sampling weights  22
 
Table 3: Within family Variation in Birth size, Parental Investments, and Other 
Variables 
Continuous Variables 
Percent of total variance explained by 
within-family variation 
Number of Tetanus injections before birth  29.05% 
Mother's age at birth (years)  9.40% 
Birth order  33.14% 
Month of birth  87.44% 
Age of Child if alive (months)  100.00% 
Dichotomous variables  Percent of families with within variation 
Age appropriate Polio coverage  26.47% 
Age appropriate non-Polio coverage  22.00% 
Breastfed for at least 6 months  40.81% 
Small-at-birth 26.49% 
Any small-at-birth siblings present in household  15.52% 
Given iron folic tablets during pregnancy  14.54% 
First antenatal visit in 1st trimester  15.60% 
First antenatal visit in 2nd trimester  24.53% 
First antenatal visit in 3rd trimester  12.72% 
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Table 4: Effect of Birth Size and Background Mortality on Parental Investments  
Age appropriate    Age appropriate Breastfed  for 
   polio coverage  non-polio coverage  6 months 
    (1) (2) (3) 
PANEL A      
Small-at-birth -0.038***  -0.032***  -0.01 
   (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 15679  15269  8571 
Number  of  mothers  7,616 7,418 4,240 
       
PANEL B     
Small-at-birth -0.006  -0.009  0.009 
   (0.02)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Small-at-birth * High IMR in village  -0.057***  -0.042**  -0.041** 
   (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 15,679  15,269  8,571 
Number  of  mothers  7,616 7,418 4,240 
 
Notes: Estimates are from mother fixed-effects models that include the following covariates:  mother’s age at birth, whether the 
mother received iron folic tablets during pregnancy, number of tetanus injections received by the mother during pregnancy, 
dummies for the trimester of first antenatal care visit, and dummies for birth order and birth month. Figures in parentheses are 




Table 5: Effect of Background Mortality Risk on Gender Differences in Parental Investments 
 
Age appropriate   
polio coverage 




   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Small-at-birth -0.006  -0.009  0.009 
   (0.02)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Small-at-birth * High IMR in village  -0.060**  -0.038  -0.042** 
   (0.03)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Male child  0.046***  0.036***  0.009 
   (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Male * High IMR in village  -0.012  -0.02  0.00 
   (0.02)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Observations 15,679  15,269  8,571 
Number of mothers  7,616  7,418  4,240 
Notes: Estimates are from mother fixed-effects models that include the following covariates:  mother’s age at birth, whether the 
mother received iron folic tablets during pregnancy, number of tetanus injections received by the mother during pregnancy, 
dummies for the trimester of first antenatal care visit, and dummies for birth order and birth month. Figures in parentheses are 
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Table 6: Effect of Health Infrastructure Availability on Parental Investments 
  
Age appropriate   
polio coverage 




 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Small-at-birth -0.003  -0.007  0.013 
   (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.014) 
Small-at-birth * High IMR in village  -0.056**  -0.037*  -0.037* 
   (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.020) 
Small-at-birth * at least PHC in village  -0.017  -0.007  -0.014 
   (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.032) 
Small-at-birth * at least PHC * High IMR   -0.012  -0.03  -0.021 
   (0.055)  (0.057)  (0.048) 
Observations 15,679  15,269  8,571 
Number of mothers  7,616  7,418  4,240 
Notes: Estimates are from mother fixed-effects models that include the following covariates:  mother’s age at birth, whether the mother 
received iron folic tablets during pregnancy, number of tetanus injections received by the mother during pregnancy, dummies for the trimester 
of first antenatal care visit, and dummies for birth order and birth month. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. * Significant at 10%, ** 
Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%.    26
 Table 7: Sensitivity of Birth Size Effects to Presence of Other Small-at-Birth Siblings in the Household 
 
Age appropriate   
polio coverage 




   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Small-at-birth -0.045***  -0.036***  -0.007 
   (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Any small-at-birth siblings present  -0.024  -0.013  0.006 
   (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.014) 
      
Observations 15,679  15,269  8,571 
Number of mothers  7,616  7,418  4,240 
Notes: Estimates are from mother fixed-effects models that include the following covariates:  mother’s age at birth, whether the 
mother received iron folic tablets during pregnancy, number of tetanus injections received by the mother during pregnancy, 
dummies for the trimester of first antenatal care visit, and dummies for birth order and birth month. Figures in parentheses are 
standard errors. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%.     27
 
 
Table 8: Effect of Birth Size and Background Mortality on Parental Investments: Estimates from  
Models without Additional Covariates 
   Age appropriate  Age appropriate Breastfed  for 
   polio coverage  non-polio coverage  6 months 
   (1)  (3)  (5) 
Small-at-birth -0.022  -0.019  0.011 
   [0.017]  [0.016]  [0.013] 
Small-at-birth * High IMR in village  -0.061***  -0.045**  -0.039** 
   [0.022]  [0.021]  [0.019] 
Observations 15,679  15,269  8,571 
Number of mothers  7,616  7,418  4,240 
Notes: Estimates are from mother fixed-effects models without additional control variables. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** 
Significant at 1%.  
 